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Preface
In the past 10 years, the logistics community has absorbed an incredible amount of change. Two-Level Maintenance was heralded as the means of significantly reducing the logistical tail without impacting mission readiness. Analyzing the lessons from Operation ALLIED FORCE will help us reach a better understanding of its impact on our combat capability. 
Abstract
The Secretary of Defense tasked the Air Force to reduce its mobility footprint in support of contingency operations. Reduced budgets, force structure, equipment, and infrastructure forced the Air Force to reevaluate its logistical structure. Specifically, the logistics community had to find a better way to move thousands of personnel and equipment to support our expeditionary aerospace forces.
The result of these efforts was a new concept in logistical support. Lean Logistics and its principal concept, Two-Level Maintenance (TLM), sought to shrink the mobility footprint by drastically reducing base intermediate-level repair and establishing a leaner two-level repair process. TLM promised to reduce the logistical infrastructure, produce significant savings and manpower costs, and increase survivability during contingency operations.
A closer analysis of TLM shows that it did not achieve the full measure of the intended benefits. The projected net savings for implementing TLM did not materialize because of unexpected cost overruns. Transferring the repair of avionics boxes and engines from base level to depot level resulted in a bottleneck of 5,575 critical parts in the depot repair system. Audits conducted by federal and military audit agencies observed a sharp increase in aircraft cannibalizations following TLM implementation and a steady decline in mission capable rates.
This paper will analyze in detail the impact of TLM, its impact during Operation ALLIED FORCE, and propose some recommendations that will hopefully improve this key logistical process.
Introduction
Logistics as a whole saw an incredible transformation after the Persian Gulf War. Although
Operation DESERT STORM validated our logistical capability, it highlighted the size of our logistical footprint in terms of equipment and personnel required to accomplish the mission. In the aftermath of this conflict, the Air Force realized that it had to find the means of shrinking this logistical tail. Two-Level Maintenance (TLM) was one of the key initiatives under the Air Force's "Lean Logistics" concept that reduced intermediate maintenance at base level and significantly curtailed mobility requirements for contingency operations.
In the past seven years, we have seen a significant decline in the Combat Air Forces' mission capability rates (figure 1). Many factors have contributed to this steady decline. Budget reductions, increased operational tempo, and lower enlisted retention rates have all contributed to this decline. The decline in mission capability also raises some questions relating to the drastic and far reaching measures that were taken with the implementation of TLM. Although TLM appeared to be a sound solution for the Global Reach-Global Power strategic vision of the early 1990s, the reality has set in at the beginning of the 21st century that our logistics system is struggling to meet operational needs for the new Global Engagement strategic vision. To better understand these drastic changes implemented with TLM, it is important to first discuss the evolution of aircraft maintenance concepts that preceded the advent of Lean Logistics and TLM. 
Historical Evolution
The Air Force began testing different approaches to aircraft maintenance back in the Vietnam War. Studies conducted during this period showed that some improvements in mission readiness were achieved with centralized maintenance, but were not fully implemented due to deficiencies in command and control structures. 2 The Maintenance Posture Improvement Program (MPIP) was a series of studies conducted during the mid-1970s that analyzed alternative aircraft maintenance structures. The Pacific Air Command (PACAF) at bases in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines mainly conducted these studies. During the MPIP, each maintenance activity was examined for potential cost savings, mission capabilities, and reduced vulnerability. The program sought to identify strategies that would achieve improved mission capabilities while simultaneously reducing cost.
Centralized Intermediate Repair Concept
The main concept studied under MPIP was the Centralized Intermediate Repair Concept (CIRL). This concept had two main elements: (1) the Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF), which repaired avionics, engines, and performed limited field maintenance, and (2) the Forward Operating Locations (FOLs), which would perform flightline-only maintenance.
During the course of these studies, analysts noted improvements in mobility, increased sortie production, improved survivability, and enhanced resource management. 3 An additional benefit of CIRL was that assembly line production methods enhanced the quality of the maintenance being performed. The increase time between maintenance actions for CIRF items resulted in a 42 percent reduction in man-hours by the FOLs per sortie. 4 Basically, the CIRF allowed maintenance personnel to devote more time and attention to on-equipment actions such as delayed discrepancies. The added emphasis on flightline maintenance resulted in higher sortie generation capability. 5 Although the studies validated the efficiency of regional repair facilities, the concept was abolished in 1987, since PACAF felt that regional repair facilities would be too vulnerable during an enemy attack. 6 Facilities at Kadena were decentralized since PACAF believed that repair facilities would be more survivable if there were scattered rather than centralized at one or two locations. These efforts for innovation vanished and opened the way for the more traditional means of aircraft maintenance. 
Three-level Maintenance

Research Question
Can the current TLM system adequately respond and sustain the needs of our global expeditionary force? What other alternatives or options exist to improve the TLM structure? 
Limitations of the Research
Part 2
Two-Level Maintenance Program Assessment
Without supplies neither general nor a soldier is good for anything.
-Clearchus of Sparta
Lean Logistics, "Tooth-to Tail"
Two-Level Maintenance Studies
During the military buildup of the 1980s, the Air Force dedicated over one-third of its manpower to aircraft maintenance. 1 As the US prepared to execute DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the military moved more than 550,000 passengers and 500 tons of cargo in support of this operation. As a result of this immense footprint, DoD Directive 947 was issued, tasking the Air Force to examine the feasibility of reducing or eliminating selected levels of maintenance in support of the Global Reach-Global Power concept. Enhance combat capability while reducing the annual operating cost of Air Force systems by adopting state-of-the-art business practices and streamlined processes, and by reducing infrastructure throughout the Air Force logistics community. Two levels of maintenance could be the most cost-effective maintenance structure, but only if the depot component repairs system is sufficiently responsive to obviate the need for the much greater investments in spares that would be required with current depot pipeline times. If the depot's performance stays the same, performance would suffer under TLM unless sufficient spares were available to fill the longer pipelines. Thus, the effectiveness of TLM depends heavily on Air Force Logistics Centers' motivation and ability to achieve genuinely relevant, timely, and robust depot-level component repair. AFMC personnel did not repair sufficient quantities to meet requirements for 86 percent of the critical items reviewed. As a result, weapons systems, associated line replacement units, and subassemblies unnecessarily accumulated over 1 million not mission capable (NMC) hours, and had approximately 5,575 outstanding priority backorders. Furthermore, sufficient assets were not available Figure 3 shows the total cannibalization rates since the inception of TLM .
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As a result of the TLM implementation, the reduction of equipment and personnel deploying to contingencies impacted the mix and number of items needed in readiness spares packages (RSP). A 1995 Air Force Audit report discovered that the depots did not accurately adjust readiness spares package requirements for items transitioning to TLM. The audit stated:
Item managers did not always adjust time-phased requirement computations, and weapon system product directorates did not remove all items used to support repair of next higher assemblies from appropriate RSP. Weaknesses in the internal control structure associated with the approval and implementation of RSP caused these conditions. As a result, RSP requirements were misstated by at least $61.9 million.
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Responsiveness
The Air Force Audit Agency and the General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted audits that highlighted additional areas of concern. The GAO report stated that TLM did not achieve the full spectrum of cost savings. Critical to the successful implementation of TLM was responsiveness in terms of turnaround times for avionics LRUs and engines inducted into the depot repair facilities. The GAO report discovered that after three years of TLM, the turn-around times for engines had in some instances doubled from the pre-TLM averages. Table 1 summarizes the repair turn-around times for engines under TLM. 
Logistical Effectiveness during AWOS
This section will discuss how TLM impacted the execution of the Air War over Serbia.
Although the logistical data captured from AWOS is still raw in many respects, it presents a clear picture of how TLM had detrimental consequences during this contingency.
Mission Readiness
A comparison of the mission capable rates during Operation ALLIED FORCE and
Operation DESERT STORM reveal a significant reduction in mission readiness ( 
Cannibalization Rates
The fact that fewer parts were available to fix jets created another problem all by itself.
Aircraft cannibalization (Cann) is a common practice when a given part is not immediately available in the supply system. Canning aircraft parts during AWOS became a necessary evil in order to reduce the number of broken jets due to the extended supply pipeline under TLM.
( figure 3) . Those who saw TLM as the answer to our logistical challenges stated that TLM would not impact mission readiness. This was one of the fallacies of TLM. Without readily available parts, maintenance personnel had to resort to cannibalization, significantly increasing the workload and in some instances, degrading the life of the LRUs most frequently canned.
During Operation ALLIED FORCE, many weapon systems saw a sharp increase in cannibalization rates (Table 3) . To reduce this trend, USAFE/LG directed the establishment of Contingency High Priority Mobility Support Kits and the formation of Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities, which will be discussed later. percent of all removed parts were found serviceable and returned to the flightline for further troubleshooting. 7 This capability was diminished with TLM and directly contributed to increased non-mission capable rates for supply.
Under the TLM concept, all reparables from deployed locations must be shipped back to CONUS for repair, and then shipped back to the deployed location from CONUS to support The elimination of intermediate-level repair capability at the deployed location can account for the significant decrease in mission readiness due to supply. Another factor contributing to this negative indicator was the additional time required for parts to be shipped to the depots and returned to the AOR. The assumption that replacement parts would be readily available simply did not materialize. The end result was that maintainers were forced to cannibalize these parts from other aircraft.
Depot's Responsiveness
Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) played a decisive role during the Air War over
Serbia. AFMC deployed Combat Logistics Support Squadron (CLSS) personnel to support
Operation ALLIED FORCE. In combat conditions, CLSS personnel quickly and expertly repaired battle-damaged aircraft, tackling some of USAFE's toughest maintenance challenges.
CLSS personnel also provided critical support during aircraft phase inspections. 10 AFMC's depot support under TLM faced many difficulties. According to USAFE/LG staff, there were occasions when it was difficult to reach the right person at a given ALC on weekends and after duty hours. There were instances when item managers actually stopped working urgent issues after close of business. 11 In order to get an answer, USAFE staff teams had to call a variety of management levels, ranging from first-line supervisors to ALC commanders.
According to one staffer, "ALC support during off-hours was poor, particularly during grave shift. We often had to wait until start-of-day shift (0700-0800 local) to talk to someone that could provide answers. We did utilize ALC Battlestaffs and Command Centers, but even those organizations did not have the necessary after-hour point-ofcontact lists for every conceivable parts problem. Additionally, weekend support was even more difficult and frustrating, especially with contractors. Often the "On-Call" person could not be reached. It is imperative that someone "On-Call" needs to respond ASAP, not the next day!" 
USAFE's Logistics Initiatives
Two weeks after the launch of Operation ALLIED FORCE, the USAFE Logistics staff was staring at a dismal 13.6 percent non-mission capable rate for supply. 13 The staff realized that the insufficient quantities of spares in the MRSP and the lack of organic repair capability were at the root of the supply problem. On 3 April 1999, the USAFE/LG issued a message to headquarters Air Force advising them that they would be forced to create supplemental supply kits and establish intermediate-level facilities in order to support the war effort.
14 By issuing this message, USAFE/LG abandoned the TLM concept to successfully support the war effort.
Contingency High Priority Mobility Support Kits
The purpose of the Contingency High Priority Mobility Support Kits (CHPMSK) was to provide additional spares to augment the MRSP kits. These were necessary to support requirements in addition to the MRSP authorizations because under the AEF concept, most units deployed with limited maintenance capability to keep the logistics footprint to a minimum. 15 The decision to create CHPMSK was based on the high non-mission capable rates for supply (TNMCS) experienced my most strike aircraft. This move by itself did not alleviate the sustainment issue during Operation ALLIED FORCE. As a result, the USAFE logistics staff had to take one additional step to correct the TLM crisis. The basic foundation of combat support is a motivated and ready force tailored, organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish tasks. Combat support leaders should always be looking for ways to optimize their forces to more effectively and efficiently support the warfighter. For example, competitive sourcing and privatization initiatives may reduce cost but could impact how forces are organized. Combat support operations in the twenty-first century will continue to require a highly responsive and agile combat support force. The success of combat support depends on flexibility in adapting to evolving military strategy, budget constraints, and emerging technology advances.
Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities
Gold Flag Program Introduction
For decades, aircraft repair technicians condemned many aircraft parts with an Expendability, Recoverability, Reparability Code (ERRC) of XB3, or XF3. Technicians did not have the time, equipment or the technical data necessary to find and repair faulty subcomponents. Very little ingenuity or initiative was encouraged to build repair procedures or to find repair centers for these parts. At that time it was simply more expedient to purchase a new part. Back in 1990, Colonel Richard Zwieg had a vision concerning the future of logistics:
We can not continue down the same road and throw away hundreds and thousands of dollars. We have to take a positive long lasting quality approach by attempting to repair the parts that were up to this time taboo or hands off.
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Benefits of the Gold Flag Program
The result of this vision became know as the Gold Flag Program. The Air Force Gold Flag
Program's main objective was to optimize Air Force self-sufficiency by repairing previously discarded components. The Gold Flag office identified high demand or high dollar assets and investigated the feasibility of repairing assets either locally or through contract repair. Normally, items coded XF3 were routed to the appropriate back shop for repair. If the back shop could not repair the item, the item would be sent to the Gold Flag office for repair. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
We cannot become confused about the fundamental purpose of our armed forces. That purpose is their readiness to fight and win our nation's wars.
-General Fogleman
Two-Level Maintenance Program Assessment
TLM brought sweeping changes that impacted every aircraft maintenance operation in the United States Air Force. These changes were necessary to a degree because of budgetary reductions and force reduction during the early 1990s. TLM supporters viewed it as the primary means of improving combat capability by reducing the logistical footprint. TLM did indeed accomplish this, but not without degrading supportability and time-definite resupply, two of the Air Forces' core combat support principles. 1 This chapter will present the conclusions of this research and provide some solutions that can be applied to TLM.
Incompatibility with Expeditionary Mission
TLM was built before the Air Force evolved to an expeditionary mission. The shift from a massive logistical structure during DESERT STORM to a much leaner mobility footprint during Operation ALLIED FORCE was based on the rapid movement of assets from CONUS depots to the AOR. The assumption was that as aircraft components failed, replacement parts would be immediately shipped via express carriers in minimum time. As it turned out, depots did not have spare assets in their pipeline ready for shipment to the deployed units. 
Aircraft Cannibalizations
TLM advocates discarded concerns that its implementation would force maintenance personnel into additional cannibalization actions due to lack of parts, and increased repair timelines. This concern became a reality and the data presented on figure 2 shows how cannibalization actions skyrocketed from fiscal year 1993 to present.
TLM was the key element of the Lean Logistics Movement of the early 1990s. By significantly cutting the number of parts in the MRSP kits, equipment, and personnel for AEF deployments, aircraft sortie generation had to rely on cannibalization actions that added additional wear and tear on removed components.
Transportation Dilemma
One of the assumptions made by TLM was that the Air Force would not have to purchase additional parts to compensate for the longer repair pipeline. Express service made this assumption credible, based on the idea of just-in-time deliveries. AFDD 2-4 states that:
These resupply measures can also be used in reverse to provide a pipe-line to return reparables to overhaul sites. The "agile logistics" concept requires fewer spares to be used more efficiently. For the concept to work, reparables cannot accumulate either in theater or in transit. 2 In many instances when parts were available, they did not arrive expeditiously utilizing express carriers such as Federal Express or DHL. The experience during ALLIED FORCE was that express service did not always work, mainly because of Customs' bureaucratic holdups and limited weekend and holiday deliveries in host countries.
Conclusion
This researcher concluded that TLM was implemented without sound strategic and operational doctrine. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4 states that responsiveness, sustainability, and time-definite resupply are critical combat support functions needed to guarantee successful deployment and sustainment of operational aerospace forces. 
Specific Recommendations
This study concluded that the ability to repair unserviceable assets in the AOR is critical to sustaining combat operations. While the jury is still out on whether TLM should be retained or eliminated in its entirety, the logistical community can take immediate steps to improve the current logistical system. We can begin this transformation by convening a Two-Level CREP implementation would begin by convening a TCAP to determine which TLM components could be more easily converted to CREP. The next step would be to add the equipment and personnel requirements to the unit's UTC package. Most of these requirements are already in place at wing-level Gold Flag flights.
Prepositioning of Supply Assets
As Congress became painfully aware of the "shallow force" threat facing the military in the late 1990s, they re-apportioned funding to purchase aircraft parts to reverse the downward trend in mission readiness ( figure 1 ). This reversal provides the Air Force with the option to preposition MRSP kits, munitions, and associated aircraft equipment in support of contingency operations. Prepositioning mission-essential assets (MEA) forward is not a new idea; the Air Force first used prepositioning during the Berlin crisis and currently maintains a fleet of ships containing munitions to support contingency operations. 4 The idea of prepositioning MEAs fits well with the current AEF concept, which requires rapid response to global crises. This concept has been studied thoroughly by RAND who concluded that:
Comparing systems with and without prepositioning, the systems with prepositioning show advantages in most situations calling for large-scale quickresponse capability. 5 Items that would be ideal for preposition include engines and associated removal/installation equipment, munitions trailers, and MRSPs. These items can be prepositioned in CONUS at Air Logistics Centers, strategic aerial ports, overseas fighter bases, or at overseas strategic aerial ports. This concept has its limitations, to include increased operational costs, political problems related to acquiring and maintaining overseas storage facilities, and uncertainties concerning the security and wartime availability/serviceability of prepositioned materiel. Supply Liaison (MSL) into one distribution office located at the work center level. 7 The study concluded the consolidating all portions of the base-level repair cycle could reduce processing time by as much as 33 percent. 8 This reduction in reparable processing time would streamline procedures, and reduce delays or errors between functional areas. This concept, when combined with the Combat Repair and Enhancement Program, could create potential synergistic effects for sustained combat operations at deployed locations.
Establishing Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities (CIRF)
Chapter 1 described in detail the historical evolution of CIRFs and how it became a viable alternative for intermediate-level repair after the elimination of three-level maintenance. The studies identified improvements in sortie production, survivability, and resource management.
The idea underlining this maintenance concept was that most of the available economies of scale can be achieved while possibly keeping pipelines shorter than when the depot repair system is the sole source of repair.
Operation ALLIED FORCE became a case study for the necessity of CIRFs during contingency operations at deployed locations. During this operation, the USAFE staff established four CIRFs (Lakenheath, Mildenhall, Spangdahlem, and Aviano) that significantly reduced repair turnaround times for avionics LRUs and engines designated as TLM assets.
There are many areas that require further study before we can fully embrace the centralized 
